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Abstract:	  	  Our	  ability	  to	  tell	  stories	  about	  ourselves	  has	  captivated	  many	  theorists,	  
and	  some	  have	  taken	  these	  developments	  for	  an	  opportunity	  to	  answer	  longstanding	  
questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  personhood.	  	  In	  this	  essay	  I	  employ	  two	  skeptical	  
arguments	  to	  show	  that	  this	  move	  was	  a	  mistake.	  	  The	  first	  argument	  rests	  on	  the	  
observation	  that	  storytelling	  is	  revisionary.	  	  The	  second	  implies	  that	  our	  stories	  about	  
ourselves	  are	  biased	  in	  regard	  to	  our	  existing	  self-­‐image.	  	  These	  arguments	  undercut	  
narrative	  theories	  of	  identity,	  but	  they	  leave	  room	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  narrative	  self-­‐
knowledge.	  	  The	  theory	  accommodates	  the	  first	  skeptical	  argument	  because	  there	  are	  
event-­‐descriptions	  with	  retrospective	  assertibility	  conditions,	  and	  it	  accommodates	  the	  
second	  argument	  by	  denying	  us	  epistemic	  privilege	  in	  regard	  to	  our	  own	  pasts.	  	  The	  
result	  is	  that	  we	  do	  know	  our	  pasts	  through	  storytelling,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  a	  contingent	  fact	  
of	  some	  of	  our	  stories	  that	  they	  are	  about	  ourselves.	  	  
Keywords:	  personal	  identity;	  narrative	  identity;	  self-­‐knowledge;	  memory;	  retrospective	  description	  	  	  There	  are	  theories	  of	  personal	  identity	  that,	  descending	  from	  Locke,	  seek	  to	  account	  for	  selfhood	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  deep	  mental	  or	  psychological	  connection	  to	  the	  past.1	  	  Call	  these	  Diachronic	  or	  D-­‐Theories	  of	  personhood.	  	  D-­‐Theorists	  answer	  a	  variety	  of	  questions	  including	  ‘What	  am	  I	  really?’	  or	  ‘Which	  actions	  were	  genuinely	  expressive	  of	  me?’,	  and	  they	  do	  so	  by	  specifying	  a	  criterion	  of	  sameness	  across	  time.	  	  Common	  criteria	  include	  the	  ability	  to	  remember	  past	  experience	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  tell	  a	  coherent	  life-­‐story;	  the	  relevant	  theories	  then	  describe	  the	  self	  variously	  as	  something	  substantial	  or	  constructed.	  	  Opposed	  to	  D-­‐Theories	  stands	  another	  class	  of	  theory,	  call	  it	  the	  Episodic	  or	  E-­‐Theory	  of	  personhood.	  	  E-­‐Theorists	  deny	  that	  anything	  definitive	  of	  personhood	  subsists	  throughout	  the	  temporal	  span	  of	  human	  life.	  	  While	  they	  share	  a	  tendency	  to	  give	  deflationary	  answers	  to	  the	  questions	  that	  motivate	  D-­‐Theories,	  E-­‐Theorists	  likewise	  differ	  significantly	  in	  regard	  to	  how	  they	  define	  the	  self.	  	  Some,	  such	  as	  Hume	  (1739	  [2000]),	  conclude	  that	  there	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is	  no	  self	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  experience	  is	  fleeting.	  	  Others,	  such	  as	  Galen	  Strawson	  (2011),	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  real	  and	  substantial	  selves	  coming	  into	  and	  going	  out	  of	  existence	  at	  remarkably	  short	  intervals.	  	  In	  most	  such	  cases	  of	  D-­‐Theories	  and	  E-­‐Theories,	  the	  inference	  is	  from	  some	  fact	  about	  human	  experience	  or	  psychology	  to	  some	  conclusion	  about	  personal	  identity.	  	  Both	  sorts	  of	  theory	  allege	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  ‘What	  am	  I?’	  by	  considering	  the	  narrower	  question	  ‘How	  do	  I	  think	  about	  or	  experience	  myself?’	  	  	  This	  essay	  challenges	  one	  such	  attempt	  to	  infer	  a	  thesis	  about	  personal	  identity	  from	  a	  thesis	  about	  self-­‐experience,	  namely	  the	  narrative	  version	  of	  a	  D-­‐Theory.	  	  My	  argumentative	  intentions,	  however,	  are	  not	  mainly	  negative.	  	  By	  presenting	  and	  responding	  to	  a	  pair	  of	  skeptical	  arguments	  based	  on	  the	  psychology	  of	  memory,	  I	  argue	  that	  narrative	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  externalist	  theory	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  rather	  than	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  personhood.	  	  The	  skeptical	  arguments	  show	  that	  persons	  are	  often	  unreliable	  storytellers	  about	  their	  own	  past,	  so	  that	  construing	  our	  ability	  to	  tell	  such	  stories	  as	  a	  criterion	  of	  personhood	  would	  lead	  to	  unpalatable	  results.	  	  The	  study	  of	  memory	  discourages,	  it	  seems,	  some	  attempts	  to	  derive	  a	  D-­‐Theory	  of	  personal	  identity	  from	  psychological	  or	  experiential	  phenomena.	  	  Even	  the	  most	  humbling	  revelations	  about	  human	  memory	  nevertheless	  leave	  room	  for	  self-­‐knowledge,	  but	  they	  encourage	  the	  assimilation	  of	  some	  diachronic	  self-­‐knowledge	  to	  historical	  knowledge	  generally.	  	  Significant	  knowledge	  of	  our	  past	  results	  from	  public,	  corrigible	  acts	  of	  storytelling	  rather	  than	  from	  simple	  acts	  of	  introspection.	  	  	  1.	  One	  difficulty	  for	  theories	  of	  identity	  rests	  in	  the	  common	  confusion	  between	  ideals	  of	  human	  flourishing	  and	  criteria	  of	  personhood.	  	  We	  would	  like	  to	  have	  integrity,	  for	  instance,	  and	  so	  some	  insist	  that	  integrity	  is	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  being	  a	  person.	  	  Such	  mistakes	  have	  framed	  debates	  between	  E-­‐Theorists	  and	  D-­‐Theorists,	  including	  the	  one	  between	  Derek	  Parfit	  and	  Marya	  Schechtman	  from	  a	  few	  decades	  ago.	  	  Parfit	  (1984)	  defended	  an	  E-­‐Theory,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  he	  gave	  a	  moral	  injunction	  to	  exercise	  detachment	  from	  our	  pasts	  (or	  futures).	  	  His	  more	  focused	  arguments	  mounted	  a	  compelling	  challenge	  to	  the	  inference	  from	  psychological	  continuity	  to	  metaphysical	  identity:	  the	  fact	  that	  my	  conscious	  life	  is	  continuous	  with	  a	  certain	  past	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  I	  am	  uniquely	  attached	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to	  that	  past,	  or	  that	  I	  am	  in	  any	  deep	  way	  the	  same	  person	  who	  experienced	  that	  past.	  	  Continuity	  is	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  ‘connectedness’,	  just	  as	  a	  conversation	  can	  continue	  without	  any	  of	  the	  same	  participants	  or	  topics	  (and	  so	  without	  a	  definitive	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  same	  conversation).	  	  One	  can	  appreciate	  these	  points	  without	  Parfit’s	  otherworldly	  thought-­‐experiments	  about	  fission	  and	  fusion,	  or	  the	  suggestion	  that	  we	  may	  have	  memories	  (quasi-­‐memories	  or	  ‘q-­‐memories’)	  not	  connected	  to	  our	  past.	  	  But	  even	  granting	  that	  one	  cannot	  derive	  personal	  identity	  from	  memory,	  this	  says	  nothing	  about	  how	  particular	  persons	  should	  regard	  their	  histories.	  	  In	  her	  early	  career	  Schechtman	  (1990,	  1996)	  made	  an	  industry	  of	  uncovering	  some	  of	  the	  confusions	  of	  Parfit’s	  argumentative	  machinery.	  	  She	  dismissed	  the	  fission	  and	  fusion	  experiments	  by	  insisting,	  rightly,	  that	  memories	  are	  individualized.	  	  We	  cannot	  reasonably	  imagine	  anything	  like	  two	  people	  sharing	  a	  memory	  (and	  hence	  sharing	  a	  past	  through	  fission),	  since	  differences	  in	  personal	  history	  before	  or	  after	  the	  remembered	  event	  will	  be	  reflected	  in	  how	  the	  event	  is	  remembered.	  	  Memory	  content	  cannot	  be	  abstracted	  in	  the	  simplistic	  way	  that	  Parfit	  demanded,	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  still	  in	  a	  film	  sequence.	  	  But	  this	  point	  about	  the	  individuation	  of	  memories	  does	  not	  imply	  anything	  about	  what	  Parfit	  called	  connectedness	  to	  the	  past,	  and	  Schechtman	  (2001)	  later	  supplied	  the	  missing	  step	  by	  arguing	  that	  memory	  allows	  for	  ‘empathic	  access’.	  	  Her	  assumption	  was	  that	  in	  order	  for	  my	  past	  actions	  to	  be	  really	  mine,	  I	  must	  have	  some	  direct	  relationship	  to	  them.	  	  In	  Parfit’s	  better	  moments,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  merely	  requested	  of	  his	  readers	  that	  they	  take	  a	  more	  detached	  stance	  towards	  their	  pasts	  and	  futures.	  	  The	  q-­‐memory	  arguments	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  dispensable	  propaedeutic	  to	  this	  point.	  	  The	  dispute	  between	  Schechtman	  and	  Parfit	  hinged	  ultimately	  on	  which	  approach,	  D-­‐Theory	  or	  E-­‐Theory,	  provides	  a	  better	  picture	  of	  human	  flourishing.	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  later	  polemic	  by	  Galen	  Strawson	  (2004)	  highlighted	  the	  elitist	  implications	  of	  this	  whole	  debate.	  	  Schechtman	  and	  Parfit	  were	  really	  arguing	  about	  whether	  persons	  should	  feel	  connected	  to	  their	  remembered	  pasts,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  	  Psychologists	  have	  since	  confirmed	  that	  some	  people,	  whom	  Strawson	  labels	  ‘episodics’,	  look	  to	  the	  past	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  detachment,	  whereas	  others	  find	  a	  deep	  connection	  in	  their	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memories.2	  	  Episodics,	  for	  instance,	  ask	  not	  ‘which	  actions	  of	  my	  past	  are	  really	  mine?’	  but	  rather	  ‘how	  could	  I	  have	  done	  such	  things?’	  	  Perhaps	  they	  answer	  ‘it	  doesn’t	  even	  seem	  like	  me	  at	  all’,	  or	  they	  simply	  shrug	  in	  indifference	  as	  they	  inhale	  the	  scent	  of	  the	  fleeting	  present.	  	  Strawson	  concluded,	  quite	  reasonably,	  that	  an	  episodic	  is	  not	  for	  that	  matter	  less	  a	  person	  than	  is	  the	  self-­‐constituting,	  authentic	  practitioner	  of	  Schechtman-­‐style	  existentialism.3	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  the	  case	  that	  some	  diachronics	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  past.	  	  A	  liberated	  child	  soldier,	  or	  a	  victim	  of	  sexual	  abuse,	  is	  not	  always	  best	  served	  by	  living	  in	  the	  moment	  and	  exercising	  an	  easy	  detachment	  from	  remembered	  events.	  	  These	  considerations	  should	  discourage	  inferences	  from	  ethical	  ideals	  to	  metaphysical	  conclusions	  (or	  vice	  versa),	  if	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  than	  that	  ethical	  ideals	  –	  including	  Frankfurt’s	  (1987)	  ‘wholeheartedness’	  but	  also	  Strawson’s	  happy-­‐go-­‐lucky	  episodic	  -­‐	  reflect	  parochial	  preferences.	  Distinguishing	  between	  two	  senses	  of	  the	  verb	  ‘to	  identify’	  helps	  to	  separate	  these	  issues	  of	  personal	  identity,	  human	  flourishing,	  and	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  In	  this	  essay	  I	  employ	  ‘identify*’	  for	  the	  intransitive	  sense	  of	  ‘identify	  with’	  as	  in	  ‘he	  identifies	  with	  how	  you	  feel’	  or	  ‘she	  
identifies	  with	  the	  downtrodden’.	  	  Many	  theorists	  assume	  that	  our	  ability	  to	  identify*	  in	  this	  sense	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  personhood,	  but	  it	  is	  fairly	  clear	  from	  examples	  that	  it	  does	  not.	  	  We	  identify*	  with	  all	  sorts	  of	  things,	  and	  even	  when	  we	  identify*,	  as	  D-­‐Theorists	  wish,	  with	  our	  own	  past,	  that	  past	  is	  sometimes	  imagined	  or	  falsified.	  	  Some	  psychologists	  even	  encourage	  counterfactual	  autobiography,	  so	  that	  people	  who	  identify*	  with	  a	  non-­‐existent	  past	  are	  not	  all	  delusional	  (Campbell	  1997).	  	  Identification*	  is	  a	  mental	  act,	  albeit	  one	  that	  often	  comes	  with	  ethical	  requirements.4	  	  In	  identifying*	  with	  my	  own	  history	  I	  summon	  the	  passions	  of	  earlier	  pursuits,	  do	  what	  I	  should	  have	  done	  then,	  and	  generally	  feel	  one	  with	  my	  earlier	  apparitions.	  	  Identification*,	  ‘empathic	  access’,	  and	  ‘psychological	  connectedness’	  all	  refer	  to	  a	  sort	  of	  solidarity,	  the	  likes	  of	  which	  can	  be	  experienced	  in	  regard	  to	  someone	  or	  something	  that	  is	  historically	  and	  biologically	  distinct	  from	  the	  self	  or	  even	  non-­‐existent.	  	  D-­‐Theorists	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  such	  solidarity	  with	  our	  actual	  past	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Klein	  and	  Nichols	  (2012)	  summarize	  this	  research.	  
3	  Hence	  Strawson	  (2004:	  447)	  writes,	  “On	  the	  strong	  form	  of	  Schechtman’s	  view,	  I	  am	  not	  really	  a	  person.”	  
4	  Schechtman	  (2001:	  102)	  defines	  ‘empathic	  access’	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  “affective	  remembering	  of	  the	  past,	  together	  with	  its	  behavioral	  implications.”	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crucial	  to	  human	  flourishing.	  	  But	  even	  if	  that	  thesis	  is	  true,	  it	  does	  not	  license	  the	  further	  conclusion	  that	  this	  is	  what	  defines	  a	  person	  as	  a	  person.	  	  There	  are	  many	  persons,	  and	  types	  of	  person,	  for	  whom	  dissociation	  from	  the	  remembered	  or	  actual	  past	  is	  of	  great	  importance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘Identify’	  without	  an	  asterisk	  will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  transitive	  sense	  of	  ‘to	  specify	  an	  object	  for	  description’,	  as	  in	  ‘we	  have	  identified	  the	  problem’.	  	  My	  point	  of	  calling	  a	  theory	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  externalist	  is	  to	  stress	  that	  it	  requires	  that	  we	  identify	  our	  past	  only	  in	  this	  sense.	  	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  past	  does	  not	  require	  identification*	  with	  it,	  and	  knowledge	  of	  our	  own	  case	  provides	  no	  exception.	  	  Self-­‐knowledge	  without	  identification*	  can	  satisfy	  the	  strictest	  criteria	  of	  meaningfulness,	  and	  it	  can	  underwrite	  moral	  obligations.	  	  The	  American	  historian	  who	  studies	  the	  slave	  trade	  does	  not	  identify*	  with	  seventeenth-­‐century	  plantation	  owners,	  but	  she	  does	  learn	  to	  appropriate	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  racial	  injustice.	  	  Some	  episodics	  are	  likewise	  storytellers	  about	  their	  own	  past,	  and	  some	  storytelling	  (e.g.,	  confession	  of	  long	  past	  criminal	  activity)	  has	  a	  structural	  requirement	  that	  the	  storyteller	  does	  not	  identify*	  with	  any	  character,	  even	  where	  one	  character	  is	  the	  same	  person	  as	  the	  storyteller.	  	  The	  issue	  is	  only	  whether	  and	  how	  persons	  give	  reliable	  descriptions	  of	  their	  past	  in	  narrative	  form,	  not	  whether	  the	  act	  of	  remembering	  implies	  any	  deep	  connection	  to	  it.	  	  The	  big	  question	  that	  narrative	  self-­‐examination	  can	  answer	  is	  ‘how	  did	  I	  ever	  get	  here?’	  	  And	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  may	  or	  may	  not	  tell	  us	  what	  the	  meaning	  of	  it	  all	  is.	  	  	  	  	  2.	  One	  outcome	  of	  these	  conceptual	  distinctions	  is	  that	  storytelling	  is	  separable	  from	  identification*,	  so	  that	  we	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  what	  Strawson	  would	  label	  the	  storytelling	  episodic.	  	  Strawson	  distinguished	  episodics	  from	  diachronics	  in	  regard	  to	  styles	  of	  self-­‐experience,	  since	  some	  people	  identify*	  with	  their	  memories	  more	  strongly	  than	  do	  others.	  	  This	  distinction,	  however,	  seemed	  to	  run	  together	  with	  the	  observations	  that	  some	  people	  tell	  stories	  about	  their	  pasts	  whereas	  other	  do	  not,	  and	  that	  some	  people	  may	  know	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themselves	  better	  than	  do	  others.5	  	  But	  there	  is	  no	  prima	  facie	  reason	  why	  an	  episodic	  should	  tell	  fewer	  stories,	  just	  as	  there	  are	  no	  obvious	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  one	  type	  of	  person	  should	  have	  more	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  Our	  reformed	  criminal	  and	  our	  recovered	  drug	  addict	  may	  confess	  stories	  about	  the	  past	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  dissociation,	  and	  these	  confessions	  may	  express	  sophisticated	  forms	  of	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  There	  are	  thus	  people	  who	  know	  their	  past	  without	  identifying*	  with	  it,	  just	  as	  there	  are	  probably	  people	  who	  identify*	  with	  a	  past	  but	  have	  mostly	  false	  beliefs	  about	  it.	  	  	  	  	  There	  are	  also	  people	  who	  opt	  not	  to	  tell	  stories	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  this	  is	  to	  be	  held	  distinct	  from	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  those	  people	  identify*	  with	  their	  past	  selves.	  	  In	  the	  original	  text	  of	  “Against	  Narrativity”	  Strawson	  recited	  a	  striking	  argument	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  non-­‐storytellers	  have	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  themselves	  than	  do	  storytellers.6	  	  He	  considers	  what	  I	  call	  the	  Skeptical	  Argument	  from	  Revision:	  1. Memory	  in	  human	  beings	  is	  deeply	  revisionary.	  2. If	  we	  tell	  stories,	  we	  remember	  more.	  3. Therefore,	  if	  we	  tell	  stories	  we	  revise	  more.	  4. If	  we	  revise	  more	  (by	  telling	  stories),	  then	  our	  sense	  of	  self	  is	  less	  accurate.	  5. Therefore,	  to	  know	  ourselves	  it	  is	  better	  not	  to	  tell	  stories	  about	  ourselves.	  The	  conclusion	  to	  this	  argument	  has	  the	  appearance,	  but	  only	  the	  appearance,	  of	  paradox.	  	  It	  would	  be	  unfortunate	  if	  the	  effort	  to	  know	  about	  ourselves	  through	  sharing	  stories	  of	  the	  past	  were	  a	  futile	  endeavor,	  but	  some	  cognitive	  endeavors	  are	  self-­‐defeating	  in	  similar	  ways.	  	  Correcting	  a	  language-­‐learner’s	  grammar,	  it	  has	  long	  been	  believed,	  inhibits	  rather	  than	  aids	  language	  acquisition7;	  psychologists	  have	  claimed	  that	  some	  classes	  of	  decision	  are	  better	  executed	  when	  they	  are	  not	  consciously	  deliberated	  beforehand8;	  and	  common	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Strawson	  (2004:	  446)	  allows	  that	  “anything	  goes”	  in	  regard	  to	  how	  these	  distinctions	  align,	  but	  he	  examines	  only	  diachronic	  storytellers	  and	  episodic	  non-­‐storytellers.	  	  In	  (Strawson	  2007)	  he	  then	  equates	  diachronicity	  with	  storytelling	  and	  being	  episodic	  with	  non-­‐storytelling,	  which	  conflicts	  with	  his	  previous	  better	  judgment.	  
6	  Strawson	  (2004:	  447):	  “the	  narrative	  tendency	  to	  look	  for	  story	  or	  coherence	  in	  one’s	  life	  is,	  in	  general,	  a	  gross	  hindrance	  to	  self-­‐understanding.”	  	  He	  does	  not	  propose	  the	  following	  argument	  in	  the	  simplified	  form	  in	  which	  I	  present	  it,	  although	  he	  does	  accept	  each	  line	  in	  the	  argument	  (447-­‐448).	  	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  original	  version	  of	  the	  essay	  from	  Ratio	  because	  he	  has	  removed	  or	  changed	  some	  of	  the	  relevant	  passages	  in	  the	  later	  anthologized	  versions.	  7	  The	  seminal	  publication	  in	  the	  instructional	  literature	  is	  Hendrickson	  (1978).	  8	  Dijksterhuis	  A,	  Bos	  MW,	  Nordgren	  LF,	  van	  Baaren	  RB	  (2006)	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experience	  provides	  cognate	  phenomena	  for	  some	  morally	  questionable	  activities,	  such	  as	  the	  liar	  who	  complicates	  his	  situation	  by	  telling	  more	  lies,	  or	  the	  overly	  defensive	  person	  who	  moves	  further	  from	  a	  just	  defense	  the	  more	  that	  she	  advocates	  her	  cause.	  	  Strawson	  merely	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  personal	  narrative	  is	  potentially	  an	  activity	  of	  this	  sort,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  memory	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  epistemically	  unreliable.	  	  	  The	  premise	  that	  ‘memory	  in	  human	  beings	  is	  deeply	  revisionary’	  is	  both	  harmless	  and	  hard	  to	  dispute.	  	  It	  admits	  of	  elaborations	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts.	  	  Each	  instance	  of	  recalling	  an	  event,	  as	  Strawson	  related,	  brings	  about	  physiological	  alterations.	  	  Many	  studies	  also	  show	  that	  sharing	  a	  memory	  leads	  to	  alterations	  of	  its	  semantic	  content.9	  	  Your	  storytelling	  friend	  will	  likewise	  change	  the	  details	  slightly	  each	  time	  that	  she	  tells	  the	  story.	  	  Even	  if	  she	  is	  not	  especially	  prone	  to	  embellishment,	  she	  will	  accumulate	  changes	  that	  eventually	  (1)	  make	  later	  retellings	  markedly	  different	  from	  earlier	  ones	  and	  (2)	  bring	  it	  about	  that	  she	  becomes	  less	  clearly	  aware	  of	  how	  she	  originally	  experienced	  the	  event.	  	  She	  will	  not	  be	  sure	  which	  features	  she	  experienced	  the	  first	  time,	  and	  which	  were	  added	  on	  through	  later	  retellings.	  	  The	  second	  premise	  of	  the	  proposed	  argument	  is	  nearly	  trivially	  true,	  and	  the	  third	  follows	  with	  some	  qualification	  from	  the	  first	  two.	  	  By	  frequently	  retelling	  her	  story,	  your	  friend	  changes	  her	  perspective	  on	  it	  more	  significantly	  than	  she	  would	  if	  she	  never	  retold	  it,	  or	  retold	  it	  only	  a	  few	  times.	  	  Some	  psychologists	  (Freeman	  2010:70)	  have	  speculated	  that	  there	  is	  a	  threshold	  of	  story	  repetition,	  after	  which	  the	  story	  tends	  to	  become	  heavily	  stylized	  or	  conventionalized;	  we	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  any	  story	  told	  very	  many	  times.	  Storytellers	  are	  therefore	  in	  one	  respect	  all	  revisionary,	  even	  though	  some	  storytellers	  are	  classed	  by	  Strawson	  as	  ‘revisionary’	  and	  others	  not.	  	  Some	  people	  embellish	  or	  justify	  their	  past	  in	  order	  to	  impress	  their	  friends	  or	  conceal	  their	  wrongdoings.	  	  Perhaps	  others	  are	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Strawson	  relies	  on	  LeDoux,	  Debiec,	  and	  Nader	  (2003),	  and	  slides	  from	  the	  former	  point	  to	  the	  latter.	  	  In	  either	  case,	  however,	  I	  find	  the	  claim	  harmless.	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revisionary	  in	  these	  morally	  questionable	  senses,	  but	  if	  they	  dare	  to	  story-­‐tell	  then	  they	  are	  nonetheless	  revisionary	  in	  the	  more	  basic	  sense.10	  It	  is	  the	  fourth	  step	  of	  Strawson’s	  argument	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  debate.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  	  	  4.	  If	  we	  revise	  more	  (by	  storytelling),	  then	  our	  sense	  of	  self	  is	  less	  accurate.	  This	  thesis,	  however,	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  1-­‐3,	  nor	  is	  it	  supported	  by	  additional	  psychological	  literature.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  it	  follows	  from	  1-­‐3	  that	  storytellers	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  past	  actions	  or	  events	  that	  differs	  markedly	  from	  how	  they	  previously	  viewed	  them,	  and	  this	  threatens	  the	  possibility	  of	  identifying*	  with	  the	  past	  self	  about	  whom	  we	  tell	  stories.	  	  But	  this	  is	  where	  the	  argument	  begins,	  not	  where	  it	  ends.	  	  Most	  theorists	  of	  narrative	  have	  considered	  our	  experiences	  of	  the	  present	  to	  be	  incomplete	  or	  epistemically	  limited.	  	  Strawson	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  overtakes	  an	  assumption	  from	  the	  earlier	  empiricist	  tradition	  in	  epistemology	  concerning	  how	  perception	  plays	  a	  foundational	  role	  in	  knowledge.	  	  He	  adopts	  the	  Lockean	  view	  according	  to	  which	  memory	  is	  simply	  a	  ‘revived’	  perception.11	  	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  farther	  we	  depart	  from	  any	  given	  experience,	  in	  terms	  of	  content	  or	  time,	  the	  more	  problematic	  our	  situation	  becomes.	  	  Our	  past	  experience	  of	  past	  events	  (the	  original	  perception)	  marks	  the	  standard	  against	  which	  the	  memory	  is	  to	  be	  measured,	  and	  on	  this	  test	  it	  indeed	  scores	  poorly;	  more	  poorly,	  it	  seems,	  the	  more	  that	  psychologists	  learn	  about	  how	  memory	  works.	  	  But	  there	  is	  no	  deep	  philosophical	  injunction	  to	  assess	  retrospection	  on	  the	  model	  of	  observation,	  and	  some	  research	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  psychology	  has	  discouraged	  the	  assimilation	  of	  memory	  to	  perception.12	  	  	  So	  do	  storytellers	  have	  a	  less	  accurate	  sense	  of	  self?	  	  Nothing	  of	  this	  sort	  follows.	  	  But	  if	  premises	  1-­‐3	  are	  valid,	  then	  storytelling	  is	  revisionary.	  	  And	  if	  storytelling	  is	  revisionary,	  then	  storytellers	  cannot	  reliably	  recount	  stories	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  past	  agents,	  even	  if	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For	  my	  part,	  I	  doubt	  that	  there	  are	  serious	  moral	  differences	  among	  us	  in	  this	  regard,	  but	  I	  retain	  the	  distinction	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  Argument	  from	  Revision.	  	  More	  likely	  is	  that	  we	  are	  all	  guilty,	  at	  times,	  of	  revising	  in	  morally	  questionable	  ways.	  
11	  Locke	  (1689)	  X.2:	  memory	  is	  “the	  power	  to	  revive	  again	  in	  our	  minds	  those	  ideas	  which,	  after	  imprinting,	  have	  disappeared,	  or	  have	  been	  as	  it	  were	  laid	  aside	  out	  of	  sight	  .	  .	  .	  memory,	  which	  is	  as	  it	  were	  the	  storehouse	  of	  our	  ideas.”	  
12	  Wittgenstein,	  rather	  than	  Locke,	  is	  the	  philosophical	  hero	  of	  this	  literature.	  	  See	  Moyal-­‐Sharrock	  (2009).	  	  Anscombe	  (1950)	  provides	  a	  focused	  examination	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  memory	  and	  perception,	  perhaps	  more	  so	  than	  the	  contemporaneous	  texts	  by	  Wittgenstein.	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the	  storyteller	  is	  the	  same	  person	  as	  one	  of	  the	  agents.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Argument	  from	  Revision	  imposes	  a	  serious	  condition	  on	  diachronic	  self-­‐knowledge,	  implying	  that	  the	  storyteller	  resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  identify*	  with	  her	  past	  self.	  	  3.	  One	  rhetorical	  flaw	  in	  narrative	  theories	  results	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  common	  parlance	  employs	  the	  word	  ‘narrative’	  in	  a	  dismissive	  way,	  as	  when	  we	  discover	  that	  a	  person	  misunderstands	  herself	  by	  adopting	  an	  all-­‐too-­‐common	  trope.	  	  A	  friend	  of	  mine,	  for	  instance,	  is	  currently	  struggling	  with	  the	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  his	  younger	  brother.	  	  A	  law	  student	  at	  an	  Ivy	  League	  university,	  the	  young	  man	  is	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  considerable	  worldly	  success.	  	  But	  an	  unpleasant	  experience	  as	  a	  volunteer	  has	  led	  him	  to	  overuse	  the	  concept	  of	  desert	  in	  regard	  to	  material	  wealth,	  and	  he	  has	  concluded	  that	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  poor	  is	  a	  product	  of	  their	  own	  laziness.	  	  My	  friend	  expresses	  this	  point	  by	  telling	  me	  that	  his	  brother	  ‘has	  adopted	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Made	  Man’.	  	  In	  indicating	  his	  brother’s	  self-­‐understanding,	  my	  friend	  seems	  to	  have	  meant	  both	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  this	  narrative	  structure	  is	  a	  contingent	  matter	  and	  that	  its	  application	  to	  his	  brother’s	  case	  is	  questionable.	  	  Recent	  psychological	  work	  has	  supported	  this	  suspicious	  turn	  of	  common	  parlance.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  more	  interesting	  theses	  in	  the	  current	  literature	  is	  that	  memories,	  and	  so	  the	  narratives	  based	  upon	  them,	  are	  self-­‐fulfilling	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  self-­‐conception	  of	  the	  person	  in	  question.	  	  This	  motivates	  a	  skeptical	  argument	  that	  is	  in	  some	  respects	  even	  more	  dangerous	  than	  the	  one	  based	  on	  revision,	  which	  we	  can	  call	  The	  Skeptical	  Argument	  from	  Selection:	  1. The	  selection	  of	  memory	  episodes	  is	  biased	  in	  regard	  to	  our	  self-­‐concept.	  2. Therefore,	  such	  episodes	  cannot	  serve	  as	  sufficient	  evidence	  of	  that	  concept.	  3. We	  often	  have	  independent	  evidence	  for	  the	  inaccuracy	  of	  someone’s	  self-­‐image.	  4. Therefore,	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  stories	  that	  people	  tell	  about	  themselves.	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Psychologists	  (Singer,	  Blagov,	  and	  Berry	  2013)	  have	  sought	  to	  explain	  the	  first	  premise	  by	  postulating	  distinct	  memory	  systems	  for	  particular	  events	  and	  for	  self-­‐images	  or	  concepts.	  Memories	  of	  particular	  events	  are	  called	  ‘episodic	  memories’,	  and	  it	  seems	  that	  small	  children	  possess	  these	  long	  before	  the	  development	  of	  autobiographical	  memory.	  	  When	  autobiographical	  memory	  develops,	  probably	  in	  early	  adolescence	  (Habermas	  2011),	  persons	  acquire	  more	  or	  less	  malleable	  self-­‐concepts	  that	  serve	  as	  filters	  determining	  which	  particular	  events	  make	  it	  to	  recall.	  	  These	  concepts	  are	  supposed	  to	  form	  a	  different	  system,	  because	  they	  possess	  a	  degree	  of	  independence	  from	  the	  episodic	  memories.	  	  The	  conclusion	  of	  this	  interpretation	  of	  the	  research,	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  autobiographical	  narratives	  we	  adopt	  have	  a	  prohibitive	  effect	  on	  memory	  recall,	  excluding	  many	  episodes	  that	  would	  bring	  our	  narrative	  into	  question.	  	  A	  woman	  who	  has	  adopted	  the	  narrative	  of	  an	  individualist,	  or	  an	  Independent	  Woman	  (perhaps	  one	  who	  identifies*	  with	  Beyoncé’s	  music),	  will	  be	  more	  prone	  to	  recall	  moments	  when	  she	  rejected	  men,	  gained	  financial	  independence,	  or	  other	  such	  fitting	  memories.	  	  Her	  recall	  is	  under	  the	  grip	  of	  her	  narrative,	  just	  as	  in	  more	  general	  historiography	  an	  investigator	  can	  look	  for	  and	  discover	  true	  descriptions	  of	  past	  events	  that	  best	  match	  the	  initial	  research	  hypothesis.	  	  	  No	  one	  should	  find	  the	  conclusion,	  to	  this	  point,	  either	  surprising	  or	  distressing.	  	  We	  learned	  when	  we	  were	  very	  young	  not	  to	  naively	  trust	  the	  self-­‐serving	  stories	  that	  people	  tell,	  and	  it	  is	  common	  for	  people	  to	  receive	  each	  other’s	  tales	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  skepticism.	  	  The	  surprising	  element	  enters	  only	  when	  we	  consider	  that	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  restrict	  the	  argument	  to	  other	  people:	  5. If	  my	  self-­‐concept	  has	  selected	  memories	  in	  a	  manner	  over	  which	  I	  have	  no	  control,	  then	  my	  own	  memories	  would	  provide	  no	  evidence	  of	  that	  concept.	  6. But	  there	  is	  no	  apparent	  basis	  on	  which	  I	  could,	  with	  warrant,	  exempt	  myself	  from	  the	  rule	  that	  persons	  filter	  memories	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  self-­‐concepts.	  7. Therefore,	  I	  should	  not	  treat	  my	  stories	  of	  my	  past	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  I	  am.	  The	  proposed	  argument	  concludes	  that	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  be	  suspicious	  of	  our	  own	  stories,	  at	  least	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  role	  as	  evidence	  if	  not	  also	  (as	  the	  Argument	  from	  Revision	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has	  it)	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  actual	  content.	  	  I	  should	  not	  treat	  my	  memories	  as	  support	  for	  my	  self-­‐concept,	  because	  the	  research	  tells	  me	  that	  my	  mind	  is	  going	  around	  my	  back,	  as	  it	  were,	  selecting	  confirmatory	  memories	  and	  ignoring	  disconfirmatory	  ones.	  	  This	  conclusion	  more	  clearly	  poses	  a	  dilemma	  for	  diachronic	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  Note	  that	  the	  argument	  does	  not	  require	  that	  we	  have	  specific	  evidence,	  in	  our	  own	  case,	  that	  our	  sense	  of	  self	  is	  inaccurate	  or	  flawed.	  	  My	  stories	  about	  my	  humble	  beginnings	  and	  subsequent	  rise	  to	  prominence	  cannot	  overturn	  my	  belief	  that	  I	  am	  self-­‐made.	  	  But	  nor	  can	  these	  stories	  serve	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	  belief,	  since	  the	  very	  belief	  is	  partly	  responsible	  for	  their	  accessibility	  as	  remembered	  stories.	  Since	  the	  argument	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  our	  self-­‐concepts	  are	  always	  or	  usually	  false,	  it	  says	  nothing	  about	  whether	  we	  in	  fact	  have	  self-­‐knowledge.	  	  It	  implies	  only	  that	  we	  do	  not	  attain	  such	  knowledge	  directly	  by	  means	  of	  recalling	  stories.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  I	  am	  able	  to	  summon	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  my	  past	  actions	  does	  not,	  in	  isolation,	  provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  version.	  	  Autobiographical	  storytelling	  is	  radically	  fallible,	  and	  the	  memories	  that	  appear	  to	  support	  it	  lack	  the	  characteristics	  that	  philosophers	  typically	  have	  sought	  in	  introspection:	  storytelling	  about	  our	  own	  past,	  no	  matter	  how	  vivid	  that	  past	  feels	  and	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  we	  incline	  towards	  identification*	  with	  it,	  is	  neither	  transparent,	  immediate,	  nor	  certain.	  	  To	  whatever	  extent	  we	  wish	  to	  know	  about	  our	  past,	  then,	  we	  should	  become	  as	  skeptical	  towards	  our	  own	  stories	  as	  we	  tend	  to	  be	  about	  those	  of	  other	  people.	  The	  question	  still	  stands,	  however,	  whether	  telling	  more	  stories	  complicates	  rather	  than	  improves	  our	  situation.	  	  The	  defender	  of	  the	  Argument	  from	  Revision	  will	  likely	  see	  the	  Argument	  from	  Selection	  as	  supporting	  her	  case.	  	  Perhaps	  storytellers,	  to	  exacerbate	  Strawson’s	  initial	  worry,	  pack	  lies	  on	  top	  of	  lies;	  they	  revise	  and	  distort	  memories	  that	  resulted	  from	  selection	  bias	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  But	  this	  worry	  overlooks	  one	  of	  the	  premises	  of	  selection	  skepticism:	  we	  can	  sometimes	  tell	  the	  difference	  between	  true	  and	  false,	  or	  supporting	  and	  non-­‐supporting,	  narratives.	  	  This	  is	  why	  we	  can	  assert	  the	  premise	  that	  ‘we	  often	  have	  independent	  evidence	  for	  the	  inaccuracy	  of	  someone’s	  self-­‐image’.	  	  People	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  discriminate	  true	  narratives,	  and	  so	  the	  skepticism	  implied	  by	  the	  Argument	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from	  Selection	  is	  not	  global.	  	  It	  suggests	  rather	  that	  aspects	  of	  our	  pasts	  are	  like	  the	  fronts	  of	  our	  noses,	  invisible	  from	  our	  own	  perspective	  but	  clearly	  seen	  by	  those	  around	  us.	  	  The	  Argument	  from	  Selection	  presents	  an	  attack	  on	  first-­‐personal	  bias	  without	  threatening	  narrative	  self-­‐knowledge	  as	  such.	  	  There	  is	  perhaps	  a	  form	  of	  asymmetric	  and	  even	  privileged	  access	  in	  self-­‐knowledge,	  since	  no	  one	  else	  can	  make	  all	  the	  same	  statements	  I	  can	  make	  about	  my	  past	  with	  the	  same	  warrant	  (not	  having	  been	  there	  in	  my	  past,	  not	  having	  direct	  access	  to	  my	  memory,	  etc.).	  	  But	  my	  stories	  about	  my	  past	  are	  corrigible	  and	  amendable,	  so	  that	  others	  can	  and	  do	  correct	  me	  in	  my	  storytelling.	  	  Our	  self-­‐concepts	  motivate	  biased,	  perhaps	  even	  misleading,	  recollections	  of	  the	  past.	  	  Nonetheless	  it	  follows	  from	  this	  only	  that	  narratives	  based	  on	  memory	  serve	  as	  evidence	  in	  self-­‐knowledge	  only	  if	  other	  people	  broadly	  corroborate	  what	  we	  tell	  –	  the	  other	  people	  not	  being	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  selection	  bias	  in	  regard	  to	  our	  case.	  	  We	  attain	  self-­‐knowledge	  mainly	  by	  sharing	  stories	  with	  others	  and	  allowing	  the	  stories	  to	  be	  corrected	  by	  them.	  	  Hence	  my	  friend	  can	  remind	  his	  brother	  that	  the	  three	  generations	  of	  lawyers	  in	  their	  family	  has	  contributed	  to	  his	  academic	  success,	  and	  your	  therapist	  (or	  your	  friends)	  can	  assist	  you	  in	  uncovering	  episodes	  that	  your	  self-­‐narratives	  exclude.	  	  	  The	  deeper	  skepticism	  proposed	  by	  the	  Argument	  from	  Selection	  rather	  motivates	  the	  investigation	  of	  our	  otherwise	  lost	  memories,	  and	  so	  turns	  the	  Argument	  from	  Revision	  on	  its	  head	  (insofar	  as	  the	  latter	  appeared	  to	  recommend	  less	  storytelling).	  	  The	  important	  point	  is	  that	  people	  are	  able,	  in	  the	  best	  cases,	  to	  overturn	  false	  narratives.	  	  The	  public	  record	  of	  this	  point	  lies	  in	  the	  contemporary	  genre	  of	  memoir	  and	  in	  other	  instances	  of	  the	  therapeutic	  investigation	  of	  forgotten	  episodes.	  	  But	  the	  practice	  is	  much	  more	  common	  than	  these	  references	  suggest,	  and	  we	  have	  evidence	  of	  it	  on	  every	  appropriately	  critical	  discussion	  of	  our	  past.	  	  Public	  and	  social	  activities	  of	  storytelling	  require	  rather	  than	  preclude	  the	  kind	  of	  suspicion	  of	  our	  narratives	  that	  the	  Argument	  from	  Selection	  motivates:	  when	  I	  tell	  a	  story	  of	  my	  past	  it	  is	  as	  if	  I	  am	  offering	  a	  hypothesis	  for	  scientific	  debate,	  and	  inviting	  my	  interlocutors	  to	  correct	  my	  position.	  	  The	  argument	  also	  suggests	  that	  I	  should	  approach	  all	  autobiographical	  stories,	  those	  of	  others	  as	  well	  as	  my	  own,	  with	  a	  healthy	  but	  suspicious	  attitude	  towards	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  storyteller.	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4.	  Our	  skeptical	  arguments	  instruct	  the	  storyteller	  to	  refrain	  from	  identification*	  and	  corroborate	  her	  tales,	  but	  they	  say	  little	  about	  which	  stories	  are	  candidates	  for	  corroboration	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  important	  classes	  of	  event-­‐descriptions	  that	  preclude	  identification*,	  quite	  independently	  of	  any	  considerations	  about	  how	  memory-­‐contents	  may	  be	  distorted.	  	  Such	  event-­‐descriptions	  become	  assertible	  only	  retrospectively	  (retrospective	  descriptions),	  and	  so	  do	  not	  permit	  the	  kind	  of	  comparisons	  with	  past	  experiences	  at	  which	  the	  Argument	  from	  Revision	  takes	  aim.	  	  Retrospective	  descriptions	  differ	  importantly	  from	  descriptions	  that	  are	  available	  contemporaneously	  to	  the	  event	  (contemporaneous	  descriptions).	  	  This	  distinction	  provides	  a	  basic	  stock	  of	  diachronic	  or	  retrospective	  concepts,	  and	  my	  contention	  will	  be	  that	  narrative	  self-­‐knowledge	  consists	  in	  the	  appropriate	  application	  of	  these	  concepts.	  	  Diachronic	  self-­‐knowledge	  concerns	  those	  things	  about	  which	  persons	  tell	  stories:	  friendships,	  affairs,	  overcoming	  obstacles,	  bouts	  of	  depression,	  personal	  triumphs,	  etc.	  	  The	  assertibility	  of	  descriptions	  of	  these	  significant	  items,	  I	  argue,	  floats	  free	  from	  the	  ever-­‐receding	  contemporaneous	  descriptions	  at	  which	  the	  Argument	  from	  Revision	  takes	  aim.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  retrospective	  and	  contemporaneous	  descriptions	  follows	  an	  old	  observation	  by	  philosophers	  of	  action.	  	  Many	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  Elizabeth	  Anscombe	  (1950)	  and	  Donald	  Davidson	  (1967a,	  1967b)	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  a	  class	  of	  retrospective	  descriptions,	  in	  that	  some	  actions	  are	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  temporally	  variant	  effects.	  	  If	  A	  stabs	  B,	  after	  which	  B	  lives	  for	  a	  month,	  the	  action	  is	  called	  a	  stabbing	  in	  that	  interim.	  	  If	  the	  victim	  then	  dies,	  and	  the	  coroner	  declares	  the	  stabbing	  to	  be	  the	  cause,	  then	  the	  stabbing	  becomes	  a	  killing,	  and	  we	  say	  that	  ‘A	  killed	  B’.	  	  ‘Killing’,	  however,	  is	  not	  a	  linguistic	  item	  that	  has	  intrinsically	  diachronic	  identity	  conditions,	  but	  one	  rather	  that	  depends	  only	  on	  identifying	  an	  action	  by	  a	  certain	  effect.	  	  It	  can,	  but	  need	  not,	  denote	  an	  action	  that	  took	  a	  long	  time	  to	  complete.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  this	  example	  presumes	  that	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  stabbing	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  question.	  	  	  ‘Killing’	  denotes	  an	  action	  that	  is	  observable	  under	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  effect	  is	  apparent,	  hence	  we	  speak	  of	  witnesses	  to	  murders.	  	  Some	  retrospective	  descriptions	  differ	  in	  that	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they	  are	  not	  observable	  in	  the	  same	  sense:	  there	  can	  be	  a	  witness	  to	  a	  friendship,	  a	  recovery,	  or	  a	  war,	  but	  the	  people	  who	  witness	  these	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  very	  different	  activity.	  	  Consider,	  following	  Arthur	  Danto	  (1965),	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  Ideal	  Chronicler	  who	  is	  able	  to	  record	  precise	  descriptions	  of	  every	  event	  in	  the	  universe	  as	  it	  occurs,	  but	  who	  has	  no	  knowledge	  of	  future	  events.	  	  That	  sapient	  individual	  would	  not	  know,	  in	  1618	  or	  even	  1628,	  that	  ‘The	  Thirty	  Years	  War	  began	  in	  1618’.	  	  It	  is	  arguable,	  but	  not	  important	  for	  my	  exposition	  here,	  that	  the	  Chronicler	  could	  not	  even	  determine	  whether	  such	  a	  cumulative	  and	  collective	  event	  as	  a	  ‘war’	  took	  place.13	  	  The	  Chronicle	  would	  include	  rather	  statements	  such	  as	  ‘X	  defenestrates	  Y’,	  ‘Y	  falls’,	  ‘Y	  bleeds’,	  ‘Y	  dies’,	  etc.	  	  No	  one	  could	  have	  described	  these	  as	  episodes	  of	  the	  Thirty	  Years	  War	  until	  at	  least	  1648,	  because	  no	  one	  could	  have	  identified	  the	  set	  of	  events	  as	  a	  set	  that	  comprises	  that	  object.	  	  In	  this	  case	  we	  are	  not,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Davidson’s	  killer,	  describing	  an	  event	  by	  its	  effects	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  episode	  in	  a	  much	  larger	  event.	  	  	  Retrospective	  descriptions	  that	  escape	  the	  Argument	  from	  Revision,	  however,	  are	  neither	  observable	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  ‘killing’	  nor	  trivial	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  Danto’s	  examples.	  	  ‘The	  Thirty	  Years	  War’	  forces	  the	  point	  by	  making	  it	  seem	  as	  if	  historical	  knowledge	  is	  somehow	  contingent	  on	  there	  being	  an	  explicit	  temporal	  quantifier	  in	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  sentence.	  	  Historical	  terms	  (e.g.,	  ‘The	  Second	  World	  War’,	  ‘The	  Renaissance’,	  or	  ‘Pre-­‐Socratic	  Philosophy’)	  frequently	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  retrospective	  taxonomy	  built	  into	  them,	  which	  fact	  does	  not	  alone	  establish	  a	  deep	  philosophical	  point	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  retrospection.	  	  A	  similar	  example	  is	  the	  Cambridge-­‐style	  sentence	  that	  describes	  one	  event	  as	  having	  preceded	  another,	  but	  with	  little	  else	  of	  importance	  resting	  on	  this	  chronology:	  ‘The	  Battle	  of	  Liege	  was	  earlier	  than	  the	  attack	  on	  Normandy’.	  	  One	  may	  also	  place	  items	  in	  a	  sequence	  and	  then	  describe	  one	  event	  in	  regard	  to	  its	  place	  in	  that	  list	  (‘Ronald	  Reagan	  was	  the	  fortieth	  of	  our	  forty-­‐four	  presidents’)	  without	  it	  being	  the	  case	  that	  we	  thereby	  know	  anything	  significant	  about	  the	  described	  item.	  	  These	  descriptions	  do	  float	  free	  of	  minor	  variations	  in	  the	  truth-­‐value	  of	  contemporaneous	  descriptions:	  you	  can	  get	  a	  lot	  wrong	  about	  Reagan	  without	  it	  affecting	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  presidency	  was	  the	  fortieth.	  	  But	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  This	  depends,	  of	  course,	  on	  what	  counts	  as	  an	  observable.	  	  But	  thought	  experiments	  like	  this	  collapse	  once	  we	  decide	  to	  bring	  the	  underlying	  concepts	  into	  question.	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strictly	  retrospective	  aspect	  of	  the	  description	  (there	  have	  since	  been	  four	  presidencies)	  is	  insignificant	  for	  most	  who	  would	  inquire	  into	  Reagan’s	  tenure.	  In	  the	  above	  cases	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  past	  was	  better	  known	  in	  the	  past,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  not	  known	  under	  our	  particular	  comparative	  descriptions.	  	  The	  participants	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War	  could	  not	  have	  referred	  to	  it	  as	  such,	  but	  their	  knowledge	  of	  its	  events	  was	  probably	  superior	  to	  our	  knowledge	  of	  it	  except	  in	  regard	  to	  either	  its	  temporally	  removed	  effects	  or	  some	  Cambridge-­‐style	  taxonomical	  properties.	  	  There	  are	  more	  important	  kinds	  of	  retrospective	  description,	  some	  of	  which	  appeal	  to	  the	  significance	  an	  event	  has	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  place	  in	  a	  sequence.	  	  Historians	  of	  soccer	  will	  assert	  that	  ‘Thierry	  Henry	  played	  his	  last	  match	  in	  2014’.	  	  This	  description	  concerns	  the	  place	  of	  the	  entire	  sequence	  of	  events	  (all	  the	  games	  he	  played)	  to	  factors	  outside	  that	  sequence,	  such	  as	  Henry’s	  place	  in	  the	  hearts	  of	  his	  fans,	  or	  the	  place	  of	  his	  career	  in	  his	  own	  life.	  	  Other	  descriptions	  will	  situate	  an	  event	  in	  a	  sequence,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  attribute	  to	  it	  a	  causal	  role	  not	  only	  for	  other	  items	  in	  the	  sequence,	  but	  for	  a	  range	  of	  other	  events.	  	  ‘The	  night	  of	  the	  dance	  was	  our	  first	  kiss’	  can,	  in	  context,	  imply	  that	  the	  kiss	  bears	  a	  causal	  relationship	  not	  only	  to	  other	  kisses	  but	  also	  to	  marriage,	  divorce,	  reproduction,	  or	  many	  other	  (cross-­‐sortal)	  items.	  	  These	  aspects	  of	  the	  description	  do	  not	  rely	  directly	  on	  quantifying	  the	  subsentential	  terms,	  and	  they	  plausibly,	  but	  only	  by	  implication,	  describe	  significant	  aspects	  of	  the	  events	  in	  question.	  	  	  For	  some	  cases	  of	  retrospective	  description	  the	  described	  aspect	  is	  significant,	  explicit,	  and	  (relatively)	  epistemically	  independent	  of	  contemporaneous	  descriptions:	  ‘I	  met	  my	  best	  friend	  at	  the	  playground’	  describes	  one	  event	  by	  reference	  to	  a	  range	  of	  interrelated	  events	  of	  diverse	  sorts,	  and	  descriptions	  of	  those	  events	  acquire	  a	  precise	  meaning	  under	  the	  conceptual	  umbrella	  ‘friendship’.	  	  Bundling	  a	  range	  of	  events	  and	  actions	  over	  time	  in	  turn	  identifies	  the	  friendship	  as	  a	  friendship.	  	  The	  question	  of	  narrative	  self-­‐knowledge	  is	  simply	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  arrive	  reliably	  at	  descriptions	  of	  this	  sort,	  where	  the	  corresponding	  contemporaneous	  description	  was	  of	  the	  type	  ‘I	  sat	  on	  the	  swing	  next	  to	  the	  curly-­‐haired	  girl’.	  	  The	  latter	  is	  the	  claim	  of	  naïve	  experience,	  assertible	  in	  the	  immediate	  context,	  whereas	  the	  former	  is	  a	  thoughtful	  reflection	  informed	  by	  wise	  experience.	  	  It	  requires	  only	  that	  we	  order	  past	  events	  or	  actions	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  conceptual	  apparatus	  (‘friendship’)	  already	  present	  in	  our	  language.	  	  Coming	  to	  formulate,	  reliably,	  sentences	  of	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this	  sort	  requires	  that	  we	  track	  long	  conjunctive	  claims	  about	  friendships,	  drug	  addictions,	  bouts	  of	  depression,	  periods	  of	  recovery,	  traumatic	  events,	  learning	  moments,	  etc.	  	  Such	  retrospective	  descriptions	  tend	  not	  to	  be	  brought	  into	  question	  by	  minor	  variations	  in	  episodic	  memory	  content:	  we	  can	  forget	  or	  revise	  many	  of	  the	  details	  of	  sitting	  on	  the	  swing	  without	  falsifying	  the	  assertion	  that	  ‘I	  met	  my	  best	  friend	  at	  the	  playground’.	  There	  are	  some	  true	  stories	  that	  are	  not	  undermined	  by	  minor	  falsifications	  in	  detail,	  and	  some	  of	  these	  have	  retrospective	  assertibility	  conditions.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  stories	  concern	  ourselves,	  as	  when	  we	  say	  that	  we	  met	  our	  best	  friend	  at	  the	  playground.	  	  There	  are	  thus	  some	  items	  of	  descriptive	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  are	  immune	  to	  memory	  distortion.	  	  This	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  useful	  reply	  to	  the	  Argument	  from	  Revision,	  one	  that	  has	  the	  benefit	  of	  resolving	  some	  further	  debates	  between	  narrativists	  and	  E-­‐Theorists.	  	  These	  philosophers	  have	  disputed	  whether	  episodic	  persons	  can	  have	  friendships.	  	  Anthony	  Rudd	  (2007),	  following	  Kathleen	  Wilkes	  (1998),	  argued	  that	  friendship	  requires	  loyalty,	  and	  that	  loyalty	  in	  turn	  requires	  a	  strong	  level	  of	  identification*	  with	  the	  past.	  	  This	  was	  exactly	  the	  move	  that	  Strawson	  (2004)	  had	  classified	  as	  elitist,	  and	  he	  argued	  from	  literary	  evidence	  that	  some	  episodic	  persons	  have	  a	  gift	  for	  friendship.	  	  He	  then	  proposed	  (2007)	  a	  theory	  of	  ‘episodic	  ethics’	  in	  response	  to	  the	  narrativists.	  	  But	  the	  whole	  argument	  rests	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  parties	  overstress	  the	  mental	  act	  of	  identification*	  when	  it	  suffices	  that	  people	  can	  offer	  true	  retrospective	  descriptions.	  	  It	  is	  not	  a	  condition	  of	  friendship	  that	  each	  of	  the	  friends	  identify*	  with	  their	  past	  selves,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  friendship	  be	  identified	  diachronically	  and	  described	  retrospectively.	  	  If	  your	  friend	  experiences	  alienation	  from	  her	  past,	  you	  do	  not	  thereby	  have	  grounds	  for	  ending	  the	  friendship.	  	  What	  matters	  is	  only	  that	  the	  right	  kinds	  of	  actions	  and	  events	  have	  accumulated	  such	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  persons	  can	  be	  properly	  identified,	  by	  any	  interested	  party,	  as	  a	  friendship.14	  	  So,	  pace	  Strawson,	  the	  fact	  that	  episodics	  can	  be	  friends	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  ‘friendship’	  is	  not	  intrinsically	  diachronic.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  While	  you	  have	  authority	  over	  who	  is	  or	  is	  not	  your	  friend,	  this	  is	  not	  incontrovertible:	  a	  person	  x	  may	  rightly	  inform	  you	  that	  you	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  a	  person	  y,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  an	  appropriate	  sequence	  of	  actions	  (y	  attended	  your	  birthday	  party,	  you	  once	  made	  her	  a	  gift,	  she	  assisted	  you	  when	  you	  were	  in	  need,	  etc.)	  is	  identifiable.	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5.	  The	  anti-­‐realist	  connotations	  of	  ‘narrative’	  present	  a	  further	  rhetorical	  obstacle	  that	  has	  led	  many	  theorists	  astray:	  a	  narrative	  is	  a	  thing	  that	  people	  make	  or	  invent;	  it	  thus	  seems	  as	  if	  narrativists	  wish	  to	  inform	  the	  world	  that	  persons	  are	  not	  real,	  but	  rather	  inventions	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  fictive	  stories	  such	  as	  we	  find	  in	  literature	  and	  television.	  	  The	  metaphor	  works	  for	  those,	  such	  as	  Daniel	  Dennett,	  who	  believe	  that	  persons	  are	  indeed	  fictions	  invented	  by	  biological	  organisms.	  	  Dennett	  (1991)	  concluded	  that	  we,	  in	  a	  certain	  sense	  of	  ‘we’,	  do	  not	  exist.	  	  But	  this	  works	  less	  well	  when	  narrativism	  is	  not	  a	  defense	  of	  eliminativism,	  or	  does	  not	  insist	  upon	  some	  biological	  criterion	  of	  existential	  commitment.	  	  The	  person	  who	  achieves	  a	  specifically	  narrative	  form	  of	  diachronic	  self-­‐knowledge	  does	  not	  invent	  herself	  in	  the	  way	  that	  a	  storyteller	  invents	  a	  story,	  but	  rather	  she	  specifies	  sequences	  of	  significant	  actions	  or	  events	  that	  cast	  the	  past	  under	  new	  and	  previously	  unavailable	  descriptions.	  	  When	  she	  tells	  stories	  about	  herself	  she	  nonetheless	  tells	  of	  things	  that	  really	  exist	  and	  whose	  existence	  precedes	  the	  storytelling:	  I	  really	  had	  the	  friendship,	  and	  did	  not	  first	  construct	  it	  by	  relating	  the	  story.	  	  My	  knowing	  that	  there	  was	  a	  friendship	  is	  perhaps	  a	  condition	  of	  my	  accepting	  certain	  responsibilities,	  and	  my	  telling	  stories	  about	  the	  relevant	  past	  is	  perhaps	  a	  condition	  of	  both.	  	  But	  neither	  the	  knowledge	  nor	  the	  storytelling	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  the	  friendship	  existing	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Sometimes	  people	  even	  inquire	  together	  into	  these	  matters,	  as	  when	  someone	  asks	  ‘are	  we	  friends?’15	  This	  anti-­‐realist	  mistake	  has	  a	  further	  consequence,	  in	  that	  it	  disguises	  the	  fact	  that	  diachronic	  self-­‐knowledge	  is	  needed	  precisely	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  persons	  undergo	  change:	  new	  retrospective	  descriptions	  arise	  only	  because	  change	  has	  taken	  place.	  	  Meeting	  a	  stranger,	  in	  my	  example,	  became	  meeting	  my	  best	  friend	  after	  a	  subsequent	  sequence	  of	  events	  was	  completed.	  	  And	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  stories	  are	  as	  revisionary	  as	  Strawson	  feared,	  except	  that	  the	  fact	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  their	  epistemic	  value.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  I	  take	  this	  for	  a	  real	  question	  about	  personal	  history	  requiring	  shared	  investigation,	  rather	  than	  a	  disguised	  form	  of	  the	  question	  ‘will	  you	  be	  my	  friend?’	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The	  revisionary	  aspect	  of	  storytelling	  has	  often,	  but	  wrongly,	  served	  as	  reason	  to	  infer	  that	  histories	  (whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  about	  ourselves)	  are	  constructs	  and	  even	  fictional.	  	  The	  locus	  classicus	  of	  this	  debate	  is	  a	  passage	  by	  Louis	  Mink	  (1970	  [1987:	  60]):	  Stories	  are	  not	  lived	  but	  told.	  	  Life	  has	  no	  beginnings,	  middles,	  or	  ends;	  there	  are	  meetings,	  but	  the	  start	  of	  an	  affair	  belongs	  to	  the	  story	  we	  tell	  ourselves	  later,	  and	  there	  are	  partings,	  but	  final	  partings	  only	  in	  the	  story.	  .	  .	  Only	  in	  the	  story	  is	  it	  America	  which	  Columbus	  discovers	  and	  only	  in	  the	  story	  is	  the	  kingdom	  lost	  for	  want	  of	  a	  nail.	  The	  examples	  in	  this	  passage	  illustrate	  the	  retrospective	  character	  of	  stories	  rather	  than	  their	  fictive	  character.	  	  The	  historian	  does	  not	  invent	  the	  fact	  that	  Columbus	  discovered	  America.	  	  Rather,	  she	  identifies	  a	  geopolitical	  object	  called	  ‘America’,	  and	  she	  locates	  Columbus’s	  voyage	  within	  the	  chain	  of	  causally	  significant	  events	  in	  its	  history.	  	  One	  could	  not	  have	  said	  of	  Columbus	  in	  1493	  (were	  one	  in	  his	  hometown),	  ‘he’s	  not	  around,	  because	  he’s	  busy	  discovering	  America’,	  and	  this	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  ignorance	  on	  the	  part	  fifteenth-­‐century	  Genoans.	  	  One	  could	  have	  described	  the	  voyage	  in	  1493,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  call	  it	  ‘discovering	  America’	  one	  needed	  to	  frame	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  vast	  sequence	  of	  significance	  (events	  not	  otherwise	  falling	  under	  a	  type)	  available	  only	  to	  interested	  persons	  with	  several	  centuries	  of	  retrospect.	  	  In	  1493	  the	  voyage	  likewise	  was	  not	  yet	  a	  candidate	  for	  explanations	  of	  world	  politics,	  whereas	  subsequent	  changes	  in	  the	  geopolitical	  item	  ‘America’	  brought	  it	  about	  that	  the	  event	  acquired	  such	  explanatory	  power.	  	  	  	  Having	  mistaken	  retrospective	  description	  for	  fiction,	  some	  narrativists	  then	  argued	  that	  persons	  really	  are	  stories.	  	  This	  led	  in	  turn	  to	  the	  false	  suggestion	  that	  (assuming	  also	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  person)	  there	  is	  a	  single,	  correct	  narrative	  of	  my	  life	  that	  exists	  regardless	  of	  whether	  anyone	  ever	  tells	  it.16	  	  Such	  a	  view	  is	  impracticable	  as	  a	  philosophy	  of	  history	  and	  needlessly	  romantic	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  identity.	  	  At	  best	  one	  could	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  unique	  history	  to	  be	  told	  for	  each	  object	  at	  each	  time	  (from	  each	  perspective):	  a	  correct	  history	  of	  America	  today,	  but	  a	  different	  one	  tomorrow.	  	  It	  could	  even	  turn	  out	  that	  alterations	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  This	  is	  the	  train	  of	  thought	  that	  Macintyre	  (1981)	  follows	  in	  After	  Virtue,	  subsequent	  to	  his	  quotation	  of	  Mink.	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America’s	  race	  relations	  remove	  Columbus’s	  voyage	  from	  its	  role	  in	  our	  past,	  just	  as	  a	  person	  who	  experiences	  a	  traumatic	  event	  can	  make	  that	  event	  less	  significant	  by	  recovering	  from	  its	  effects.	  	  Self-­‐constitution	  theories	  of	  identity,	  which	  claim	  that	  the	  stories	  we	  tell	  (or	  some	  other	  acts	  we	  perform)	  somehow	  constitute	  the	  objects	  about	  which	  we	  tell	  them,	  are	  impracticable	  precisely	  because	  they	  are	  incompatible	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  objects,	  and	  hence	  which	  retrospective	  descriptions	  are	  true,	  change	  over	  time.17	  This	  emphasis	  on	  the	  change	  that	  the	  subject	  of	  history	  undergoes	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  attempt	  to	  identify*	  with	  our	  past	  selves	  in	  stories.	  	  My	  ability	  to	  reliably	  tell	  about	  my	  past	  is	  not	  only	  consistent	  with	  change,	  but	  rather	  it	  requires	  it.	  	  There	  is	  a	  sense,	  then,	  in	  which	  I	  reliably	  tell	  about	  my	  past	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  I	  do	  not	  immediately	  identify*	  with	  it.	  	  When	  I	  write	  about	  my	  past,	  for	  instance,	  I	  do	  not	  identify*	  qua	  writer	  with	  the	  character	  that	  represents	  me	  in	  the	  story.	  	  The	  memoirist’s	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  any	  historian:	  it	  requires	  a	  careful	  distinction	  between	  the	  writer,	  the	  narrator,	  and	  the	  main	  character	  (Birkets	  2008).	  	  And	  whether	  this	  distinction	  leaves	  room	  for	  further	  acts	  of	  empathic	  access	  or	  psychological	  connectedness	  is	  a	  separate	  question	  that	  depends	  partly	  on	  how	  much	  the	  person	  in	  question	  has	  changed.	  	  A	  person	  who	  stayed	  the	  same	  her	  entire	  life,	  and	  who	  possessed	  a	  maximal	  degree	  of	  psychological	  connectedness,	  probably	  would	  have	  very	  poor	  material	  for	  a	  memoir,	  though	  she	  may	  indeed	  have	  integrity	  and	  excel	  at	  the	  ethical	  characteristic	  that	  Schechtman	  and	  others	  misleadingly	  call	  ‘self-­‐constitution’.	  	  Likewise	  the	  theory	  of	  historiography	  requires	  that	  the	  historian	  distinguish	  her	  perspective	  from	  that	  of	  the	  persons	  investigated	  (Ankersmit	  2012).	  The	  fact	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  self-­‐knowledge,	  these	  are	  the	  same	  person	  does	  not	  reduce	  the	  need	  for	  this	  central	  element	  of	  dissociation.	  	  	  6.	  These	  conclusions	  may	  seem	  to	  present	  a	  pessimistic	  picture	  regarding	  our	  ability	  to	  know	  our	  own	  pasts.	  	  They	  suggest	  that	  we	  attain	  diachronic	  self-­‐knowledge	  only	  under	  the	  conditions	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Goldie	  (2007)	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  about	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  self-­‐constitution	  with	  change,	  albeit	  without	  this	  concept	  of	  retrospective	  description.	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1. we	  not	  immediately	  identify*	  with	  the	  past	  character	  under	  consideration,	  2. we	  have	  changed	  significantly	  since	  the	  events	  remembered,	  and	  3. we	  corroborate	  our	  stories	  with	  others	  Condition	  1	  rules	  out	  making	  any	  inference	  to	  personal	  identity:	  our	  ability	  to	  remember	  and	  recount	  past	  events	  cannot	  serve	  as	  a	  criterion	  for	  what	  makes	  a	  person	  a	  person.	  	  Condition	  2	  rules	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  object	  of	  knowledge	  being	  something,	  call	  it	  a	  self,	  that	  persists	  through	  time.	  	  ‘Self-­‐knowledge’	  is	  a	  reflexive	  noun	  (compare:	  ‘self-­‐study’	  or	  ‘self-­‐cleaning	  oven’)	  indicating	  that	  the	  object	  of	  knowledge	  happens	  to	  be	  the	  same	  entity	  as	  the	  subject.	  	  The	  person	  with	  self-­‐knowledge	  does	  not	  know	  some	  peculiar	  object	  called	  the	  self	  any	  more	  than	  a	  self-­‐cleaning	  oven	  cleans	  selves.	  	  She	  rather	  knows	  about	  friendships	  started	  and	  affairs	  ended	  by	  the	  same	  person	  that	  she	  happens	  to	  be.	  	  And	  Condition	  3	  rules	  out	  privileging	  our	  own	  memories	  over	  the	  testimony	  of	  others.	  	  But	  there	  is	  nothing	  pessimistic	  in	  any	  of	  this.	  	  As	  in	  the	  sciences,	  knowledge	  is	  a	  hard-­‐won	  achievement	  of	  human	  discourse,	  not	  the	  default	  condition	  of	  human	  nature.	  	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  of	  our	  own	  case	  as	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  rule,	  nor	  is	  this	  fact	  anything	  to	  lament.	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